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SUING GOVERNMENT. By Peter H. Schuck. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 1983. Pp. xxi, 262. $25. 
In theory, the American system of private tort law can be charac-
terized as substantively broad and remedially just. The realm of the 
public tort, however, stands distinctly apart from this substantive 
and remedial soundness. The wrongdoings of government officials, 
whether negligent or intentional, are often treated differently from 
the misconduct of others. In Suing Government, Professor Peter H. 
Schuck1 examines, clarifies, and criticizes the current public tort doc-
I. Peter H. Schuck is a professor of law at Yale Law School. 
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trine and proposes a comprehensive system of reform which would 
narrow the chasm between public and private tort law to a thin, 
practical boundary of official immunity. 
In developing Schuck's analytical framework, the first part of the 
book carefully examines the sources of official misconduct as well as 
the goals and evolution of public tort remedies. Official misconduct, 
Schuck explains, "springs from diverse sources" each demanding a 
"problem-specific" response (p. 3). While simple negligence is the 
most common source, Schuck points to others, including: "compre-
hension-based" misconduct such as message distortion, which can 
occur when court mandates filter down to the implementing officials 
(pp. 4-6); "capacity-based" misconduct such as time and budget con-
straints (pp. 6-8); and motivation factors such as peer pressure and 
concern for self-protection (pp. 8-12). 
Schuck further develops his analytical problem-solving frame-
work by examining the remedial goals of public tort law: deterring 
official misconduct, encouraging vigorous decision-making, compen-
sating victims, exemplifying moral principles, and achieving institu-
tional competence (p. 16). Schuck ultimately proposes a plan that 
purports to accommodate these often inconsistent goals more 
adequately. 
Completing his analytical framework, Schuck explains the evolu-
tionary history of public tort remedies beginning with the English 
common law and culminating with the current status of government 
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),2 section 1983,3 
and the Bivens remedy.4 The legal response to official misconduct 
remains primarily one of damage remedies against individual offi-
cials (p. 55). 
The second part of Suing Government seeks to establish the need 
for reform. Drawing upon empirical studies of low-level officials 
who most frequently deal with the public, Schuck develops a model 
of official behavior that defines officials' on-the-job response to indi-
vidual liability. Using this model to evaluate the effectiveness of of-
ficial liability, he concludes that the present system results in official 
behavior that is far from optimal. 
Since the present system is primarily one of individual liability, 
the model only addresses official behavior that results from exposure 
to "litigation-related risks" (p. 60). The term "litigation-related risk," 
is used instead of "risk of liability" because defending any suit, even 
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 240l(b)-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 
(1976). 
3. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1976). 
4. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). The Court held in Bivens that the fourth amendment implictly conferred a private 
damage remedy for its violation by federal officers. 
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those that predictably will fail, is costly and subject to outcome-un-
certainty (p. 70). Exposure to litigation-related risk, Schuck ex-
plains, flows from the particular features of the work environment. 
For the government official, those features include, for example, the 
large number of interactions with the public (p. 60), the official's le-
gal duty to act (p. 62), and the "plethora of rules" to which officials 
are subject (p. 66). The author's point is that the public official is 
exposed to a greater risk of becoming involved in litigation than his 
private sector counterpart, and that this exposure significantly influ-
ences his behavior. 
Schuck's model also explores the behavior that officials engage in 
to minimize risk. According to Schuck, there is a minimum level of 
risk, though not necessarily fixed, that any given public official is 
willing to accept. Beyond this "duty threshold" (p. 68), officials use 
various strategies to reduce their personal risk. 
One such strategy is inaction. This is perhaps the bureaucrat's 
preferred response when faced with a high-risk decision. Schuck as-
serts that inaction is a risk-minimizing option because it is too incon-
spicuous to draw a lawsuit. Moreover, even if an official's failure to 
act does not go unnoticed, such a decision is typically so well-en-
trenched in his discretionary authority that "any official duty to act 
affirmatively is as a practical matter unenforceable . . . ." (p. 72). 
Thus, the official who fears litigation has a strong incentive to do 
nothing. As the author puts it, "[i]nspectors who fail to enforce 
clearly applicable statutes against pugnacious or litigious violators 
are unlikely to be sued by the consumers whom they did not protect, 
whereas inspectors who do enforce vigorously may now be subject to 
suit under § 1983" (p. 72, emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). 
A closely related strategy is delay, which can, for example, take 
the form of unnecessary requests for supervisory approval or bur-
densome demands for additional factual data before taking action. 
Whatever the form, unnecessary delay is costly and often has the 
same result as inaction. Schuck points to the "criminal who can no 
longer be apprehended" and "parental child abuse that can never be 
wholly remedied" (p. 73) as examples of the costs of dilatory 
decisionmaking. 
Yet another method of reducing litigation-related risk involves 
the use of unnecessary formalism such as elaborate record-keeping 
and paperwork. This approach is merely another aspect of "delay" 
strategy and involves the development of painstaking, ritualistic pro-
cedures and the accumulation of data for use in defending future 
lawsuits. The result, according to the author, is that ritual predomi-
nates over public service, leading to an inflexible approach to prob-
lem-solving and decisionmaking. 
A final risk-reducing bureaucratic strategy involves the alteration 
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of the character of decisions so as to substitute relatively riskless acts 
for risky ones. For example, a parole officer may refrain from rec-
ommending the release of a seemingly worthy prisoner "in order to 
minimize the risk of being sued by potential victims" (p. 75) or FDA 
officials may fail to approve an apparently safe drug (p. 76). 
Schuck's point is simply that the consideration of litigation risks may 
significantly distort the decisionmaking process. 
In light of his model of official behavior and the established goals 
for public tort law, Schuck concludes that individual official liability 
is unsound remedial policy. He finds official self-protection to be "a 
significant and growing problem" (p. 79) and that as a result, official 
liability "exacts a high price" upon society (p. 82). 
Schuck argues that the availability of abso~ute and qualified im-
munity fails to alleviate bureaucratic risk-avoidance schemes while 
simultaneously leaving the victim of official misconduct without re-
dress. The courts' process of allocating this immunity, Schuck con-
vincingly argues, is made "on the basis of distinctions that bear little 
relationship to protecting vigorous decisionmaking" (p. 89). More-
over, these distinctions do not allow for predictability, so it remains 
unclear whether a particular decision will ultimately be entitled to 
some form of immunity. 
With the case for remedial reform well established, the author's 
emphasis then shifts to the proposed remedial measures. Schuck rec-
ommends substantially expanded governmental rather than personal 
liability for official misconduct as the best course of action. 
"[G]overnment [should] be obliged to compensate for every harmful 
act of omission committed by its agents within the scope of their 
employment that is tortious under applicable -law" (p. 111 ). Specifi-
cally, the author proposes that agencies be liable for the official mis-
conduct of those individuals within their respective departments. 
According to Schuck, such a scheme would lead to increased sys-
tem efficiency, more vigorous decisionmaking, and improved deter-
rence. The deterrence issue is, as Schuck admits, problematic. He 
nevertheless argues that deterrence will be strengthened by focusing 
the incentives to curb misconduct at a better location in the particu-
lar agency. The upper echelon of an agency, Schuck suggests, is 
"relatively well equipped to deter'' (p. 104) since "much official 
wrongdoing is ultimately rooted in organizational conditions and 
can only be organizationally deterred" (p. 98). 
Taking this proposal one step further, the author urges specific 
changes in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). These changes 
generally involve the removal of various exceptions to the FTCA. 
For example, the FTCA only applies when an act or omission is tor-
tious under applicable state law. Official actions under federal stat-
utes and regulations therefore remain immune from liability. 
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Pointing to the enormous growth of federal laws since the enactment 
of the FTCA in 1946, as well as the development of the Bivens rem-
edy for official violations of constitutional rights, Schuck sees this 
state tort requirement as an anomaly that should be repealed (pp. 
114-15). The author also proposes that the FTCA be extended to 
cover intentional torts that are currently excepted for most federal 
officials. He emphatically notes that this exception "has been con-
sistently interpreted as extending far beyond intentional torts to in-
clude the vast and rapidly growing category of negligent 
misrepresentation by officials" (p. 115, emphasis in original). 
In addition to expanding the substantive coverage of the FTCA, 
Schuck also wishes to eliminate some of the procedural obstacles to 
government liability. In order to compensate victims fully, he advo-
cates awarding a minimum damage amount for non-monetizable 
rights, punitive damages where appropriate, and attorneys fees (p. 
118). 
In the final section of the book, Schuck looks inside the "bureau-
cratic black box" (p. 123) to see how agencies will respond to ex-
panded government liability. He ultimately concludes that because 
of potential agency liability, administrators will "be pressed to antic-
ipate and respond to low-level misconduct by deploying their stock 
of behavior-shaping resources - rules, training, discipline, incen-
tives, information, organization support, and the like - in more im-
aginative and powerful ways" (p. 184). 
An examination of Suing Government indicates that, to Schuck, 
the most significant danger of expanded government liability is that 
agencies will be unsuccessful in their efforts to control official mis-
conduct. Schuck, however, suggests that this danger can be over-
come through organizational change and injunctive court remedies. 
Suing Government does not evaluate the costs associated with this 
organizational change nor does it discuss the ultimate cost to the 
government of paying claims that it would not otherwise be required 
to pay. One suspects that this cost could be enormous and that ad-
ded pressure would be put on already strained budgets, a condition 
that Schuck earlier suggests is a contributor to official misconduct (p. 
7). 
Moreover, agencies themselves, through the use of rules, incen-
tives, and discipline, may explicitly or implicitly rely on the same 
risk-aversion techniques that individual officials currently use. For 
example, Schuck himself suggests that agencies improve their capac-
ity to control misconduct by limiting official discretion with rules 
and procedures. This suggestion comes dangerously close to the for-
malism that Schuck claims is a harmful response to potential per-
sonal liability. Inaction, delay, formalism, and changes in the 
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character of decision, albeit to a lesser degree, can all be prescribed 
by the agency or administrator as well as individual officials. 
The author may also be underestimating the complexity of 
human behavior in his implicit assumption that the financial risks of 
litigation are the primary cause of the unwanted self-protection tech-
niques. Schuck largely ignores nonfinancial "litigation-related risk" 
such as the fact that a lawsuit tends to be a poor reflection of per-
formance. Officials, because they are likely to have higher ambi-
tions, will seek to maintain credibility both with superiors and the 
public by avoiding lawsuits. 
While significant uncertainties remain as to the net effect and 
cost of expanded government liability, Schuck's work is an ex-
tremely valuable contribution to the field of public tort law. The 
need for system-wide reform is convincingly advanced in realistic 
terms that compel the reader to question the current system and to 
take a hard look at alternatives. Moreover, many of Schuck's spe-
cific proposals are unquestionably sound. These proposals incorpo-
rate a great amount of preventive medicine; in this regard, Schuck is 
to be applauded for attacking the problem of official misconduct at 
its source. The corresponding "harmonizing" of the problem and 
the remedy is a central theme of Suing Government (p. 82). Its prac-
tical analysis not only makes the book interesting to read, but also 
adds to its utility as an initial blueprint for real-world reform. After 
reading Suing Government, one can only hope that such reform is 
forthcoming. 
